Outbound-only management, audit depth measured in action types rather than logins, and a clear line between what is held today, what is in evaluation, and what has not been claimed: written for the CISO and the accreditor.
Basalt was built by operators who came out of the DOD and the intelligence community, to the standard the federal government actually holds infrastructure to. Government-grade security, commercial-grade prices.
The control plane never initiates a connection into the infrastructure it manages, so a new site never needs a new inbound firewall exception. Not "fewer ports than the alternative": zero, a different category from one.
Named against the specific NIAP target Basalt is being evaluated to, not a generic hardened-baseline claim, and not a published implementation guide.
FIPS 140-3 is the federal standard for how government networks are secured. Basalt is built to that standard; it is not yet a formally validated certificate.
Not differentiators: the baseline a CISO or an accreditor expects before the differentiators even come up.
Who did it, what they did, which resource it touched, from where, and exactly when: append-only, logged locally on every node.
If a host goes down, its workloads restart elsewhere. That is what high availability means here. Basalt does not claim a warm, memory-synchronized standby the way some incumbents once did; the underlying virtualization core does not expose that mechanism, so nobody building on it honestly can.
One program’s records and resources are structurally invisible to another, not protected by an application-layer promise.
Run the numbers with your own infrastructure, then put Basalt beside your incumbent in a controlled environment, with a rollback story written down before anything moves.